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New Hampshire, by far the fastest-growing New England state over the last fourdecades, provides an intriguing case study on the political effects of population
migration. This article is an attempt to link changing demographics to verifiable
shifts in the Granite State’s politics.1  The present effort focuses on the impact of
migration on the New Hampshire House of Representatives. Beginning with an
overview of New Hampshire’s population increase, and then a brief discussion of its
impact on party identification, attention will focus on an examination of the chang-
ing profile of both major-party delegations to the New Hampshire House. An analy-
sis of selected roll-call voting in the House will follow. Finally, speculation on the
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This paper studies the political effects of population migration to New Hamp-
shire. Data suggest that, although migration from Massachusetts caused
significant “suburbanization” effects in New Hampshire over the last four
decades, demographic changes have not yielded commensurate changes in voting
behavior, or party registration in the state. But the New Hampshire House of Rep-
resentatives reveals more impact from the dramatic population increase. Popula-
tion migration has led to suburbanization of the composition of the 400-member
lower chamber. Citizen-legislators native-born to New Hampshire now compose
just slightly over a third of the House, a proportion far lower than that in other
New England states. Also, levels of education among legislators have increased
significantly. White-collar professionals and retirees now dominate the House
delegations of both major parties. A review of selected roll-call votes over the
past two decades reveals that party line voting on legislative bills has been on the
rise in several significant issue areas. A more highly educated, white-collar
citizen-legislature has not led to moderation and bipartisanship. Instead, House
legislators are increasingly polarized over a series of ideologically charged issues.
Border Crossings
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New Hampshire’s Population Increase
Since the 1960s, the U.S. population has increased 56.9 percent, from 179 million
to 281 million. During this same period, population increase for the six New En-
gland states has been more modest, at 32.5 percent. New Hampshire stands out as
the one exception. From 1970 to 1980, New Hampshire was the 13th fastest growing
state in the nation. From 1980 to 1990 it was the sixth fastest growing state.2  Over
the last decade it ranked twenty-second in population growth nationally. The next
closest New England state during the 1990–2000 period was Vermont, ranked thirty-
eighth.3  As noted in Table 1, New Hampshire has led all New England states in
population increase consistently over the past four decades. From 1960 to 2000,
New Hampshire’s population has increased 103.6 percent. The next closest state,
with a population increase of 56.2 percent, was Vermont.
For each decade, from the 1960s through the 1990s, most of the population
change in New Hampshire may be attributed more to net migration than natural
increase. Population change due to net migration for each of these decades was as
follows: 1960–1970 = 53.37 percent; 1970–1980 = 73.97 percent; and 1980–1990 =
57.40 percent.4   Net migration accounted for 46.54 percent of New Hampshire’s
population increase between 1990 and 2000.5
Richard Schaefer identifies three recent internal migration trends taking place in
the United States:
•  “suburbanization,” the movement to areas adjacent to central cities;
•  “sunning of America,” the migration of peoples living in the north
central and northeastern “snow belt” states to the southern and
western “sun belt” states;
•  and “rural life rebound,” the migration to rural areas.6
A look at New Hampshire’s population increase suggests that the state was affected
primarily by suburbanization, with eastern Massachusetts residents migrating across
the state line to the two most adjacent counties, Rockingham and Hillsborough.
Together, these two counties account for 61 percent of the population increase in
New Hampshire over the past four decades. Although significant in terms of per-
centage, the numerical population increases for Carroll and Merrimack counties,
together, only account for 15 percent of the state’s population increase (See Table
2). Influx of population to rural Carroll County, and the smaller towns of
Merrimack county, is likely explained as the attraction by individuals and families to
a more rural setting.
The Political Effects of
New Hampshire’s Increased Population
Research is abundant on the political consequences of population migration.7  An
excellent and concise overview of the various studies relating to the political impact
from population migration is provided in the introductory chapter of James
Gimpel’s Separate Destinations.8
Most studies addressing the political consequences of population migration tend
to focus on what Gimpel refers to as the “electoral foundations” of the American
political system.9  These studies look at migration’s impact on political partisanship,
voter turnout, and political ideology. The present study takes a different course of
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direction, focusing on the extent to which New Hampshire’s high rate of in-
migration has affected its elected political structure, specifically the 400-member
House of Representatives.
Minimal Changes in Party Membership
Using party membership as a measure of political change indicates that since 1970
Republicans have lost little political ground in this traditionally GOP state. As noted
in Table 3, in 1970 Republicans accounted for 41.9 percent of registered voters. In
three decades their majority has been reduced almost 4 percent. Over the same
period, Democrats remain in the minority, increasing their share of voter member-
ship by only 1 percent. Undeclared voters have increased their share by 3 percent.
Traditional Republican strongholds of Belknap, Carroll, and Rockingham counties
suffered the biggest losses in GOP registration. Republican losses were offset, how-
ever, by gains in traditionally Democratic Hillsborough county, the largest county in
the state. Another large county, Merrimack, also experienced a small Republican
gain. The largest Republican gains from 1970 to 2000 took place in Hillsborough
county, which experienced a 130 percent increase in Republican registration
(N=37,233 in 1970 and N= 85,910 in 2000). Republican losses in Rockingham
County were a result of Democrats achieving a 266 percent gain, their largest
increase in the state (See Table 4). No doubt, some portion of the Democratic
Party’s gains is a result of Rockingham’s population in-migration from traditionally
Democratic Massachusetts. The continued majority of the Republican party member-
ship in New Hampshire lends some support to Gimpel and Schuknecht’s argument
that people who are mobile are more likely to represent upper socioeconomic cat-
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Changing Profile of the
New Hampshire House of Representatives
While population increase has not yielded significant shifts in New Hampshire
voters’ party affiliation, it has apparently changed the state political institution
closest to the people, the lower chamber of New Hampshire’s citizen legislature,
the 400-member House of Representatives.
When compared to the lower chambers of the other five New England states,
the New Hampshire House of Representatives exhibits a number of distinguishing
characteristics.  For one, with 400 elected members, it is by far the largest of all
Houses in New England — the third-largest legislature in the English-speaking
world, as a matter of fact. The members of this citizen-legislature receive an an-
nual salary of only one hundred dollars. At 58.5 years, the median age of its mem-
bers is slightly higher than in the other New England states; just over a third of its
membership is retired. Another unique characteristic is the scarcity of lawyers; at
3.5 percent, it claims the lowest percentage of elected representatives of the New
England Houses whose members are attorneys. Finally, reflecting the effects of
in-migration to the state, just slightly over a third of its elected members were
born in state.
The following is a brief overview of the major shifts in the statewide composi-
tion of the New Hampshire House membership, with particular attention focused
on differences between native-born and nonnative-born House members.11
A comparison between native and nonnative House members reveals a couple
of shared similarities, and a few differences. No differences exist between native-
born and nonnative-born legislators relative to party membership or age distribu-
tion. Religiously, nonnative-born legislators are more likely to be Protestant.
When it comes to gender, education, and occupation, the data support earlier re-
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born New Hampshire House members have a higher percentage of women, are
better educated and therefore more likely to hold white-collar positions.12
In 1981, Republicans comprised 61 percent of the House; in 2001 Republicans
maintained control with 65 percent of the seats. While no significant differences in
the party composition of the New Hampshire House is apparent for the last twenty
years, there are more subtle changes in the social characteristics of the representa-
tives from each of the major parties. A comparison of the Democratic and Republi-
can membership on six demographic characteristics reveals less salient, but quite
discernible differences between the two delegations, especially between the native
and nonnative membership. We will first provide a profile of the Democratic mem-
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New Hampshire House Democrats:
Better Educated, Older, and More Female
Of the two major party delegations in the New Hampshire House of Representatives,
the profile of the Democratic Party delegation has changed the most drastically
(Table 7).
Place of birth. The percentage of home-grown Democrats, once a majority of the
delegation, has decreased significantly over the past two decades. In the 1981–82
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Hampshire; that percentage fell to 50 percent by the 1991–92 session, and was at a
twenty-year low of 36.2 percent (fifty-one legislators in all) in the 2001–02
session.
Contrary to popular perception (and fear on the part of some older New Hamp-
shire natives), home-grown Democrats were not replaced by legislators born in
neighboring Massachusetts, but by persons born in other states. Only 13.5 percent in
1981–82, and 16 percent in the 2001–02 session were born in Massachusetts. In the
2001–02 session, 46 percent of the Democratic House members were born in states
other than New Hampshire and Massachusetts.
Age. In the 1981–82 session, 35 percent of the Democratic delegation (forty-
seven legislators in all) were under forty years of age. Since then, legislators under
forty have virtually disappeared from the party; in the 2001–02 session, only 4.6
percent of the party’s 141-member delegation is younger than forty years old. Over
the same period, Democratic legislators seventy years and older have tripled, in-
creasing from 8.2 percent in the 1981–82 session, to 26.7 percent in the 2001–02
session. Democratic legislators forty to fifty-four years of age have also doubled
over the past two decades, from 17.2 percent to 35.1 percent.
In the 1981–82 session there was no significant difference in age between native-
born and nonnative-born Democratic House members. In the 2001–02 session, non-
native Democratic representatives overall are slightly older than their native-born
counterparts (See Table 8).
Gender. While the Republican delegation to the House has become increasingly
male-dominated (see next section), the Democratic delegation is marked by its gen-
der parity. Of the 141 Democrats in the 2001–02 session, seventy-one are male and
seventy are female. Gender equality in the delegation is another outcome of the last
twenty years. In the 1981–82 session, roughly two-thirds of the Democratic delega-
tion was male; and as late as the 1995–96 session, men composed nearly 60 percent
of the delegation.  Nonnative-born members account for much of this new gender
parity in the Democratic House delegation; for both the 1981–82 and 2001–02
session years, females comprised the majority of nonnative Democratic House
members.
Education. Across the board, levels of education have increased significantly in
the Democratic delegation. In the 1981–82 session, roughly three of ten Democrats
(forty-eight in all) in the House had no more than a high school education. Twenty
years later, that percentage had dwindled to 15 percent (twenty-one legislators).
The majority of House Democrats now possess a bachelor’s degree or a graduate /
professional degree. The latter, in particular, has grown by leaps and bounds over
the past twenty years. In the 1981–82 session, only seven members (4.5 percent) of
the Democratic delegation possessed a graduate or professional degree; in the 2001–
02 session, nearly three out of ten Democratic legislators (forty-one in all) hold such
an advanced degree. As with gender parity, nonnative-born legislators have espe-
cially contributed to this overall increase in education.
Occupation. Despite the significant changes in level of education, there were no
corresponding changes in the occupation profile of Democratic citizen-legislators.
Legislators with white-collar occupations made up roughly 40 to 45 percent of the
delegation throughout the last two decades. Blue-collar legislators did drop from
14.1 percent of the delegation in 1981–82, to single-digit percentages through the
1990s, rising to 10.6 percent of the delegation in the 2001–02 session. In both
1981–82 and 2001–02, the nonnative-born make up a higher proportion of white-
collar Democrats in the House than the native-born.
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The most significant shift appeared in the number of retirees who joined the
Democratic delegation. In the 1981–82 session, the number of retirees stood at
forty-four, or about 28 percent of the party delegation. Ten years later, that number
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number of retirees ranged from a low of forty-three (in the 1995–96 session) to a high
of fifty-eight (1993–94; and 1999–2000), and in 2001–02 stood at fifty, about 35
percent of the delegation. Although a slightly higher proportion of retired Democratic
House members are native-born, the difference between retired native-born and non-
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Religious affiliation. The Democratic House delegation, once dominated by
Catholics, has become much more balanced in terms of religious affiliation. In the
1981–82 session, nearly six of ten Democratic legislators (ninety-two in all)
declared themselves as Catholics; that percentage increased to 62.1 percent in 1983–
84. Since then, however, the number of Catholic, Democratic legislators has shrunk
dramatically, to only 34 percent in the 2001–2002 session.
Members of the delegation who declared themselves Protestant have increased
slightly over the last twenty years, from 21.2 percent in 1981–82, to 29.1 percent in
the 2001–2002 session. The largest increase, however, has been in those who do not
list any religious affiliation — a rise from 17.3 percent in 1981–82, to 32.6 percent
in the 2001–2002 session. The shift in religious affiliation is a reflection of an in-
creasing proportion of nonnative-born Democratic representatives, less inclined to
fit the traditional ethnic, Catholic profile more commonly found among native-born
Democrats.
House Republicans:
Older, More Educated, Male-dominated
Place of Birth.  In 1981–82, legislators born in New Hampshire made up 43 percent
of the Republican delegation, nearly double the 22.9 percent born in neighboring
Massachusetts. Over the next twenty years, the numbers of “home-grown” and Mas-
sachusetts legislators have gradually balanced. Currently, 35 percent are native-born,
while 30.4 percent were born in neighboring Massachusetts. Republican legislators
born in other New England states (including Massachusetts) have outnumbered
native-born GOP legislators since the 1989–1990 session.  While the percentage of
Democratic New Hampshire House members born in Massachusetts is much lower
than popularly believed, the percentage of Republican House members born in the
Democrat-dominated Bay State is considerably higher. In 2001–2002, 30.4 percent
of the GOP delegation reported Massachusetts as their birth state, in comparison to
16.3 percent of the Democratic House delegation. Suburban migration to the two
southern counties bordering Massachusetts appears to be the primary explanation for
this. In the 2001–2002 session, in comparison to the other eight counties,
Rockingham and Hillsborough counties had the lowest percentage of GOP legisla-
tors born in New Hampshire (31.9 percent), and the highest percentage (36.9 per-
cent) born in Massachusetts.
Age. Compared to the Democrats, the Republicans showed relatively little change
in the age distribution of its delegation. The percentage of legislators under 40, for
example, was only 13.6 percent in 1981–82, and mostly stayed above 10 percent
during the following twenty years, dropping into high single digits in the last three
sessions. Middle-aged legislators (forty to fifty-four-year-olds, and fifty-five to
sixty-nine-year-olds) also held steady to their percentages of the delegation.
The percentage of the Republican delegation seventy years of age and older has
increased, although not as significantly as for the Democrats. In the 1981–82 session
the portion of GOP House members seventy or older stood at about 16 percent.
More often than not since then, this segment of the Republican delegation has made
up more than 20 percent of the delegation, occasionally exceeding 25 percent.
Gender.  Unlike the Democrats, nonnative-born Republican Representatives have
had little effect on the gender composition of the GOP delegation. In 1981–82,
about seven of ten members of the GOP delegation were male, a proportion quite
similar to the Democratic delegation. Over the past twenty years, however, while the
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Democrats have moved toward gender parity in its delegation, the Republicans have
become even more male-dominated. Since 1991–92, the percentage of males in the
delegation has increased each session, reaching a peak of more than 80 percent in the
2001–2002 session.
Education. The Republican delegation, like its opposition, has experienced an
increase in legislators possessing a bachelor’s or graduate/professional degree. Al-
most four of ten GOP legislators had that level of education in 1981–82. In four of
the last six sessions, that percentage has exceeded 50 percent. Unlike the Democrats,
however, the percentage of those with only a high school education or less has not
decreased significantly, hovering around the 20 percent mark. As with the Demo-
cratic House delegation, the nonnative-born have contributed positively to the pro-
portion of graduate/professional degree-holders among GOP House members.
Occupation. Like Democratic House members, legislators with white-collar
occupations and retirees dominate the Republican delegation, making up more than
eight of ten legislators in the 2001–02 session. “White-collar” legislators, composing
41 percent of the delegation in 1981–82, mainly stayed above 30 percent throughout
the next twenty years, rising to a high of 45 percent in the 2001–02 session. Also
like the Democratic delegation, nonnative-born members have increased the overall
proportion of white-collar Republican House members. Equally consistent with
Democratic House members, blue-collar legislators have largely disappeared from
the GOP delegation, decreasing from 12 percent in 1981–82, to fewer than 5 percent
in the last two legislative sessions.
Republican retirees, composing 38 percent of the delegation in 1981–82, in-
creased its portion of the delegation to more than 45 percent for six of the following
ten sessions, returning to 38.9 in 2001–02. The difference between native-born and
nonnative-born retired Republican House members is significant. Close to half of
the retired members of GOP delegation are native-born. In contrast, slightly over a
third of nonnative-born GOP House members are retired, quite similar to the pro-
portion of nonnative Democratic House members who are retired (See Table 8).
Religious Affiliation. The composition of the Republican delegation, in terms of
religious affiliation, has moved in precisely the opposite direction of the Democratic
delegation. In the 1981–82 session, there were nearly four Protestant legislators in
the GOP delegation (154 in all, 64 percent of the delegation) for every Catholic
(forty-two in all, or 17.5 percent). Over the next twenty years, the percentage of
Protestant GOP legislators declined significantly, hitting a twenty-year low of 44
percent in the 1999–2000 session. Meanwhile, the number of Catholic legislators has
gradually increased, reaching a high in the 2001–02 session of 28 percent. The data
reveals no significant differences among native born and nonnative GOP representa-
tives regarding changes in religious affiliation.
Summing up. A side-by-side comparison of the Republican and Democratic del-
egations in the New Hampshire House shows that, all in all, similarities outweigh
differences. Middle-aged and elderly legislators dominate both party delegations.
Both party delegations have relatively fewer native-born members. Both party del-
egations now have better-educated legislators. White-collar professionals and retirees
dominate both party delegations.
Differences in delegations occur in gender distribution and religious affiliation.
Among Democrats, the delegation is split equally between men and women. On the
other side, males dominate the GOP delegation. Catholics, once dominant among
Democratic House members, now are roughly equal in number to Protestants.
Among Republican House members, Protestants, once a majority, are now less than
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half of the delegation, with Catholics on the increase. Where changes have taken
place, nonnative-born members in both delegations have been causes of those
changes.
One might expect that two party delegations so similar in socioeconomic back-
ground might find much common ground when they grappled with the details of
legislative action. This assumption, however, has been proven false by the increased
partisanship of the House in the last two decades.
Loosely Managed Chaos:
The Conventional Picture of
State Party Organization
New Hampshire politics often are noted for their surplus of enthusiasm and their
lack of formal organization. David Mayhew put it succinctly in his 1986 survey of
party organizations in the fifty states. Given the deluge of media attention the Gran-
ite State receives due to its first-in-the-nation presidential primary, “If any important
traditional organizations operated in New Hampshire, no doubt somebody would
have written about them by now.”13  In coming to this conclusion, Mayhew cited
(among others) a 1975 study of New Hampshire politics by Eric P. Veblen,14  who
stated:
Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans have powerful, cohesive party organiza-
tions. There is no strong party “machine” able to discipline dissident members. Frag-
mentation among party leaders, not unity, is the common state of affairs. From time to
time certain individuals are able to build strong personal organizations within a party. . .
In both the Democratic and Republican parties, the institution of the primary election has
worked against party unity. Candidates are able to succeed by appealing directly to the
voters rather than by placing top priority on cooperation with party leaders.15
A more recent study of New Hampshire politics by Michelle Anne Fistek adheres
to the conventional wisdom regarding the lack of state party organization.16 Citing as
evidence the parties’ consistent failure to nominate candidates for minor offices, as
well as their inability to contest a significant percentage of higher-profile races,
Fistek contends, “In action, the parties in New Hampshire can be best described as
incomplete, occasional, and highly decentralized.”17  According to Fistek, Demo-
cratic party organization mainly exists in major cities, while the Republicans are
merely a “loose coalition of all types and variations of Republican ideology, includ-
ing ‘closet Democrats’ who identify themselves as Republican to win office.”18  The
reasons for the lack of state party organization are several, Fistek claims:
•  Lack of significant managerial and organizational resources, such as
staffing and campaign funding (except for major offices).
•  Large size of legislature (424 members in all) makes party recruit-
ment of candidates difficult, as well as unification of party.
•  Erratic monitoring of individual legislators means many individual
votes “based on friendship, personal favors,” or the caprice of the
legislator.
•  Lack of a distinctive political philosophy in either party. Both parties
contain liberals, moderates, and conservatives.
•  Republicans in particular, who enjoy an advantage in voter registra-
tion over Democrats, do not find it in their interest to enforce
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orthodoxy on ideology. Indeed, their experience is that strong
ideological agendas often backfire, causing schisms and leading to
Democratic electoral victories.
•  Although Democrats have achieved some successes when they are
well-organized, they also have suffered from internal struggle and
turmoil.19
The Emergence of Party-Line
Voting in the New Hampshire House
While we do not contest the overall conclusion of the above scholars that New
Hampshire parties should not be mistaken for “political machines,” our analysis of
selected roll-call votes in the New Hampshire House of Representatives over the past
two decades indicates a degree of party unity (and perhaps even discipline) that
cannot be easily dismissed.
Tracking selected roll-call votes20  over the past eleven sessions of the House,
from 1979 to 2000, we found that bipartisanship, once the norm, is now the excep-
tion. At the beginning of this period, it was difficult to distinguish Democrats from
Republicans, based on how they voted on a given piece of legislation. By the end of
this period, distinguishing one party’s members from another by roll-call votes
became increasingly easier. In one issue-area after another — taxes and fiscal issues,
crime and punishment, guns, social issues such as homosexual rights and abortion
regulations — the Democratic and Republican delegations now sharply diverge from
one another. Strict segregation by party is now a fact of political life in the New
Hampshire House of Representatives, as the following data indicate.
Taxes
New Hampshire historically has placed one of the lightest tax burdens in the country
on its citizens. In 1950, the state had the third lowest tax burden in the country, and
was the lowest of all fifty states in 1970, 1990, and 1997.21  Currently, the state has
no sales or income tax. Advocates of holding the line against new taxes, such as the
prominent newspaper The Manchester Union-Leader, claim that the absence of
broad-based taxes is a key facet of “the New Hampshire advantage,” drawing busi-
ness, industry, and citizens from neighboring states to reside in a tax-free haven.
A look at selected roll-call votes in the early 1980s indicates that Democrat and
Republican members of the House stood shoulder to shoulder against new taxes. In
the 1979–80 and 1981–82 sessions, the House considered two income tax bills: a 5
percent income tax in 1979–80, and a 3 percent income tax in 1981–82. Neither bill
came even close to winning the support of a majority of Democrats or Republicans.
In fact, as Table 9 shows, the two party delegations voted in quite similar patterns
on both bills.
Some fifteen years later, a bill that would increase taxes on cigarettes showed
some evidence of divergence between the two party delegations. While Republicans
voted narrowly against the tax, Democrats voted in favor.
The 1999–2000 session vote on a 4 percent income tax was the most glaring sign
of divergence between the two party delegations. The percentage of the Republican
and Democratic party delegations voting for and against the bill were virtual re-
verses of each other: Republicans who cast votes were against the income tax by
about 4-to-1, while Democrats who cast votes were for the bill by more than 4-to-1.
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Crime Legislation
During the past twenty years, the New Hampshire House has considered several bills
concerning crime and punishment, including minimum sentencing laws, creating a
needle exchange program for drug users, and abolishment of the death penalty.
Unlike the voting pattern on taxes, there was already evidence of disparity in
Democratic and Republican voting patterns as far back as the 1981–82 session. As
with tax votes, however, this disparity increased significantly from the 1980s to the
1990s (Table 10).
In the 1981–82 session vote on minimum sentencing laws, Republican and Demo-
cratic majorities (of those casting votes) supported the measure. Such bipartisan
agreement did not materialize again on any of the three subsequent bills considered
by the House. On the 1993–94 session bill creating a needle exchange program for
drug users, 85.7 percent of all Democrats supported the measure, compared to 42.9
percent of Republicans. Similar trends emerged on the two votes on the state’s death
penalty law in the 1997–98 and 1999–2000 sessions. On both occasions, Democratic
House members voting on the bill were overwhelmingly in favor of abolishing the
death penalty, while the Republican delegation was nearly as steadfast in their sup-
port for keeping the penalty.
Abortion and Homosexual Rights Issues
From the late 1980s to the present day, New Hampshire House legislators have con-
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homosexual rights. It is worthy of note that while New Hampshire has a reputation
as a conservative state, its brand of conservatism has often been libertarian on such
issues (e.g., the legislature’s continual resistance to imposing mandatory motorcycle
helmet or adult seatbelt requirement laws). In this particular issue-area, as in the
others we have reviewed, the same pattern emerges over the 1980s and 1990s: initial
correspondence between Democrats and Republicans on roll-call voting gives way to
significant division along party lines.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the House faced several votes on issues of
abortion and homosexual rights, including a proposed ban on homosexual foster
parents; a bill requiring parental notification for minors seeking an abortion; and
two votes on a repeal of a penalty for abortion. In these four votes, there was no
significant divergence between Republican and Democratic support, as Table 11
shows.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, the gap between Republicans and Demo-
crats widened and hardened on roll-call votes regarding moral and social issues. On
a 1993–94 session bill regarding homosexual rights, Democrats voted in favor at a
rate of 11 to 1, while a majority of voting Republicans opposed it. Significant diver-
gence between the party delegations also emerged on the abortion issue, on two
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parental-notification bills in the 1995–96 and 1997–98 sessions, and a prohibition of
“partial-birth” abortions in the 1999–2000 session. Again, Republicans voted in
favor of these bills at much higher rates than Democrats did.
Environmental Issues
Roll-call votes on environmental issues in the New Hampshire House again show a
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Indeed, on four of the six roll-call votes, taken from the 1979–80 to the 1991–92
sessions — on establishment of a state environmental protection agency; a bottle
deposit bill; moose hunting; and shoreline protection — roughly equal percentages
of Republicans and Democrats voted the same on these measures.
Another vote in the 1991–92 session, however, and one in the 1997–98 session,
indicated some divergence along party lines. The 1991–92 session bill, which would
have banned the use of steel leg traps, received majority support from voting Demo-
crats, while Republicans voted in opposition to the bill by more than three to one.
Most recently, a river and shoreline protection bill gained nearly unanimous support
from Democratic House members (94.8 percent), while Republicans were much
more closely split (55.8 percent in favor, 44.2 percent opposing).
Native-born vs. Nonnative Born Legislators
Some measure of increased partisanship by Democrats and Republicans is a reflec-
tion of voting dissimilarities between native-born and nonnative-born New Hamp-
shire House members within the Democratic delegation. While no significant voting
differences were discovered between native-born and nonnative born GOP Repre-
sentatives, voting differences were evident between native born and nonnative-born
members of the Democratic House delegation on seven of the twenty-two roll call
votes discussed in this paper. Voting dissimilarities between native-born and
nonnative-born Democrats were found regarding a minimum sentencing law, a bill
requiring deposits on soft drink bottles, legislation introducing a 3 percent state
income tax, a bill banning homosexual foster parents, and three bills concerned with
abortion issues.
The 1981–82 minimum sentencing bill passed the New Hampshire House with a
comfortable 80 percent vote. Native born Democratic House members voted with
the majority on the issue, with thirty-six of fifty (72 percent) lending support to the
measure. On the other hand, nineteen of thirty-two nonnative Democratic House
members (59 percent) voted in opposition to the bill. Native-born Democrats fol-
lowed the House majority vote in a similar fashion with the 1981-82 session attempt
to introduce a 3 percent state income tax. While the bill failed with over a two-
thirds majority in opposition, three of four native-born Democrats voted against the
measure, while two out of three of their nonnative Democratic counterparts voiced
approval for the tax. The bottle deposit bill was narrowly defeated in the New
Hampshire House during the 1983-84 session, with 52 percent voting against it.
Twelve of the thirty (40 percent) native born Democratic Representatives voted with
the majority to defeat the legislation. Once again, nonnative born Democratic House
members voted in a different way, with two-thirds expressing support for the bill.
The 1987-88 session bill banning homosexuals from becoming foster parents
passed the House with 57 percent of the membership in favor. Again, native-born
Democratic House members voted with the majority on the bill (twenty of thirty-
five or 57 percent), while twenty-six out of thirty-seven (70 percent) of their nonna-
tive-born counterparts voted strongly against the measure. Two bills requiring pa-
rental notification for abortion by minors were strongly defeated in the 1987-88 and
1995-96 sessions (75 percent against in 1987-88, and 67 percent against in 1995-
96). Of interest in both instances was the level of favorable voting for the measures
among native-born Democratic House members as compared to nonnative born
Democratic House members. In 1987-88, sixteen of thirty-five (46 percent) of na-
tive born Democrats voted in favor of the bill, in contrast to five of thirty-five (14
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percent) of nonnative Democrats favoring the measure. The 1995-96 parental notifi-
cation bill involved nine of thirty-one (29 percent) of native-born Democratic
Representatives supporting the measure, in contrast to only three of forty-two (7
percent) of nonnative-born Democrats in favor. Finally, the 1999-2000 session bill
banning partial-birth abortions was narrowly defeated in the House (52 percent
against). Two-thirds of the GOP delegation voted in favor of the prohibition. Defeat
of the legislation was a product of the strong opposition from nonnative born Demo-
crats, with nine out of ten expressing opposition. Native-born Democratic House
members, while opposed to the measure, were not nearly as united, with twelve of
thirty-five (34 percent) voting in favor of banning partial-birth abortions.
Perhaps some explanation for native-born, more traditional, Democratic House
members taking a more conservative position on these issues, particularly when it
comes to abortion legislation, may reflect tendencies of “working-class authori-
tarianism” described by Seymour Martin Lipset.22  The more liberal voting positions
taken by nonnative Democrats may reflect Thompson and Moncrief’s contention
that migrants are less bound to tradition and “serve as agents of change within the
institution and offer the minority party a pool of potential recruits as they seek to
attain more competitive status.”23
Conclusions and Thoughts
on Further Research
Our research tends to support Thompson and Moncrief’s argument: “Nonnatives in
the legislatures are not necessarily ‘outsiders’ but instead reflect the makeup of the
states’ changing populations. In these states, nonnatives function to make the legisla-
tures more, not less, representative of the citizens of the states.”24  Major population
growth in New Hampshire has not resulted in significant change in voters’ party
affiliation over the past two decades, but the “suburbanization” of the state’s popula-
tion is reflected in the changing composition of the political institution most directly
representative of the state’s citizens, the New Hampshire House of Representatives.
And contrary to the conventional scholarly wisdom on the lack of party organization
and discipline among New Hampshire state legislators, party line voting has in-
creased significantly over the past two decades, over numerous issue-areas.
Several explanations are offered on why the New Hampshire House has become
more partisan, while its members have simultaneously increased across the board in
measures of socioeconomic status such as education and occupation.
•  Political party as collective identity. Given the decreased presence of
native-born legislators in the House, political party and partisanship
have become the new mode of organization and collective identity in
a legislature where individual members do not necessarily share
common social experiences and upbringing.
•  Gender. The emergence of gender parity in the Democratic House
delegation, and the increase in party line voting during the same
period of time, raises a host of questions about possible connections
between these two developments. Is there now a “gender gap” in the
New Hampshire House, and will that gap increase over time and have
discernible political effects? Another set of questions centers on how
the increased presence of female legislators in the Democratic
delegation is affecting the party internally. According to one
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authoritative study, female state legislators have often found power
in numbers, that is, increasing confidence and freedom in pursuing
issues most important to them, such as legislation dealing with
women, children, and families.25
•  New set of more divisive issues. The rise of “culture wars” issues,
such as abortion and homosexual rights, as well as the perennial
dilemma of education funding and property taxation brought on by
the state Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding the funding of
public education, has created a more divisive environment in the
House.
•  Increased party organization. Behind-the-scenes organization by
party leadership, heretofore unnoticed by scholars, has led to more
disciplined party legislative delegations. Increased discipline, as far
as we can tell, is not the result of increased party funding of cam-
paigns, or other such traditional party favors to legislators. One
possibility is that the legislators in each of the party delegations now
share more ideological affinity with each other (and ideological
opposition to the rival delegation) than in previous decades. Another
possibility may lie in the particular assemblage of legislative leader-
ship, which emerges in each session, such as the oligarchy of com-
mittee chairs. A third possibility is how the major political parties
recruit candidates for legislative office. In many House races,
winning the Republican party primary is equivalent to winning the
legislative seat, because of lack of effective two-party competition.
Also, Democrats historically try to discourage primary contests, at
least in major races.z
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